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Introduction
１－１ Introduction
In the British banking merger cases, globalisa-
tioneffects in the financial markets reinforce LMEï
led elements in preferences due to interests of stake-
holders and involve no fundamental changes in dis-
tribution mechanism of finance, profits and power.
British takeovers depend heavily on marketïled/
shareholderïled corporate governance in the decision
ïmaking processes（Hall and Soskice，２００１；Vi-
tols，２００１；Zugehör，２００３）．Enhanced LME elements
did not enforce crossïborder mergers of European
banks so easily.
“Crossïborder mergers are doubly difficult.
There is little overlap between banks from
the different countries and the logic here is
different : less cost cutting, more revenue
generation Yet, that is precisely why banks
are hesitant. Buying a bank in another
country with another language and another
legal system is a risk that few want to
take….full mergers have proved difficult.”
（The Economist, March１２２０００：１９）
The cases highlight the characteristics of the na-
tional market coordination. For understanding of this,
British large bankïmergers provide a good illustra-
tion of the operation and regulation of the UK
mergers market as a prime example of an LME. In-
deed, financial globalisation has accelerated a series
of British banking M&A activities, while it retains
the traditional distribution pattern of power of the
British LME, though with a substantial change.
Globalisation enhances both elements of the change
and the tradition. The globalisation effects in the fi-
nancial markets reflect the preferences and interests
of stakeholders. The effects have no positive power
to change framework of market political economy.
The relevant British authorities have also assessed a
bank merger depending heavily on the ‘customer
convenience（Financial Services Authority UK Finan-
cial Central Division，２０００）’base, while they estab-
lish “a regime founded on a established riskïbased
approach to the regulation of all financial business”
（Alexander，２００４）via the Financial Services and
Markets Act of ２０００ and its accompanying regula-
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tions in order to accommodate interests arising from
both globalisation and the national capitalist model.
Financial Services and Markets Act of ２０００ have
stated statutory objectives :
“maintaining confidence in the financial
system, promoting publicawareness of the
financial system, securing the appropriate
degree of protection for consumers and re-
ducing the extent to which it is possible
for business carried on by regulated per-
sons to be used for purposes connected
with financial crime.”
（Financial Services Authority UK１９９８）
Policy makers handle the framework, and its
definition. They might consider the effects, but the
shift toward more LMEïled market circumstances. In
the British bankïmerger cases, the customers must
enjoy the longïterm interests via branch network,
unchanged and enrich banking services by a merger.
For changing the market coordination, the national
political economy needs ‘intention’ of market direc-
tors（policyïmakers）with preferences of key market
coordinators（stakeholders of banks which are the
central core of national market economies）．
Therefore, this research examines, in the British
banking cases, how local M&A changing strategies
improve competition based on its basic characteristic,
and meanwhile how they reflect adaptation to finan-
cial globalisation in a banking board’s fiduciary
duty, through four institutional arrangements in the
British market economy：１）capital control of a
firm ２）mobility of the labour market，３）corporate
control of the market and ４）regulations. The
changes brought about through a ‘changing strategy’
emphasise national characteristics through both insti-
tutional arrangements and through the fiduciary duty
of a bank. For examining these, this paper chooses
British largeïbank merger cases : three cases involv-
ing Bank of Scotland : the NatWest, Abbey Na-
tional and Halifax cases.
１－２ Manager s and Regulators in M&A Ac-
tivities
British mergers such as these BoS cases are not
controlled by government policy. However the Brit-
ish FSA has been created in response to the migra-
tion of business across institutional boundaries and
the growth of financial conglomerates（YokoiïArai
and Kawasaki，２００７：１８）．British mergers are under-
taken in reaction to market signals and are effec-
tively regulated by the operation of the stock ex-
change. FSA executives argue that the administrative
goals, of establishing a free, fair and transparent
LME with global competitiveness, are decided by
market signals（share prices and corporate value）
within market discipline. Banks are sensitive to price
ïsignalling from the equity market, while their be-
haviour must be conducted under market principles.
In this point and for the protection of domestic cus-
tomers, the British government retains an administra-
tive involvement in mergerïcontrol. Regulators
forced the CEO of the Bank of Scotland, Peter
Burt, to consider more British LMEïled competitive-
ness with the effects of globalisation, and more cus-
tomer protection embedded in management. This
protection enforces business services for customers（i.
e., business products, contracts and business net-
works for customers’convenience）．As the detailed
role and definition of financial activities and innerï
organisational changes from the view of market
maintenance, the government policy modifies and
emphasises the formations and characteristics of fi-
nancial merger activities. The changes in a market
have no alters in social context of national political
economy. British regulators monitor the playing field
for banking competition via merger in the name of
for safetyïnet financial stability. The effects of
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globalisation have no drastic changes in historical
accumulations of politics and society（Vogel，２００６；
Vogel and Barma，２００７）．The banking market re-
forms highlight the banking managers have the deci-
sionïmaking responsibility to respond to the requests
of shareholders within the regulatory framework.
A series of financial reforms in the UK（The
Enterprise Act, the foundation of the Competition
Commission, the renewed definition of competitive-
ness and further LMEïled market circumstances
leading to benefits from equity markets in the Brit-
ish banking industry）has established a free, fair,
transparent and globalising domestic financial market
with competitiveness, in which detailed rules and
definitions do not direct banking management.
The British authorities in banking and merger
activities（e.g. banking : FSA, Banking merger :
OFT, CC），argue that the administrative goals to es-
tablish such a market were introduced by firms’ in-
tentions without direct state administration（Hall and
Soskice ，２００１； Vitols ，２００１，Gourevitch and
Shinn，２００５；YokoiïArai and Kawasaki，２００７）．How-
ever, it is a fact that financial reformïpackages have
thrown financial institutions into the administrative
cage. In this cage, managers drive their firms, while
they confirm the regulatory（liberal marketïled）‘traffic
sign’ for facilitating adequate business activities.
These ‘traffic signs’ structure their regulatory goals.
British policyïmakers decide the whole frameworks ;
afterwards, the stakeholders of banks can only de-
cide the allocation of benefits and finance, and its
method. The former cannot change, only the latter
can change. This case can be also be seen in the
recent, freeïcompetitionïled Japanese banking ad-
ministration, directed by the recent Ministers for the
State of Finance. Heizo Takenaka and Tatsuya Ito.
The main key of their aim and goals are for this to
optimise allocation of resources for Japanese market
economy. However, the liberal marketïled political
economy also needs some institutions to have a role
for the ‘traffic control’ of resource allocation, espe-
cially capital movements and banking stakeholders in
the national political economy. These changes show
us the slow adaptation to globalisation’s effects. In
this context, the British market economy is defined
as a liberal marketïled one.
Therefore, the policy administrators and banking
managers depend heavily on marketïsignalling in or-
der to consider the mergerïmethod considering bal-
ance between shareïprice and corporate value, and
benefits to domestic customers.
Merger activities
１）Bank mergerïstimulated market signals modify
the activities
２）Government policy has no direct control over
British large bank merger cases.
３）Government policy still retains the capacity to
handle mergerïactivities via regulatory market
maintenance and the protection of domestic cus-
tomers’ benefits.
４）Banks’ behaviour and their supportive admini-
stration（from the view of market circumstances
and customer protection）have a national M&A
strategy.
In this process firms headquartered the UK
have further shifted their managerial control from in-
ternal relations（e.g. banks, group companies, employ-
ees etc）to external elements（shortïterm sharehold-
ers）．Share prices and enterprise value are the key
criteria and the most powerful groups are coalitions
of owners（a socialisation of interests composed of
numerous small shareholders）（Vitols，２００１；Goure-
vitch and Shinn，２００５）．Managers have become fidu-
ciaries of shareholders. Their decision adapts requests
from shareholders within the regulatory cage of the
soïcalled British liberal market economy. With ac-
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ceptance of market elements（e.g.share prices, enter-
prise values）in the market, the UK system is wellï
adapted to operation within a global financial mar-
ket. Whether this is in the long term interests of the
UK economy or UK banks is a more uncertain
point. The market coordination shows us the shortï
term interests are more suitable. The tendency be-
comes stronger than before in the global context. As
a result, British banking M&A activities, stimulated
by the globalisation of financial markets, bring sub-
stantial developments to the distribution of finance,
profits and power in ‘AngloïSaxsonïstyle corporate
governance’（Zugehör，２００３）．and in the British LME.
In other words, the globalisation offers a sort of
functional disorder beyond the preïexisting regula-
tory cages for banking business practices. As the
Germany firm cases contain and highlight a sort of
AngloïSaxon characteristics in this situation, the
British firm cases also exhibit ‘Functionsweise’ of
external control（Zugehör，２００３：１７）．
１）Managers intend to maximise shareholders’
benefits.
２）Shareholders do need to take benefits from the
result of the merger activities as they can take
it from the merger processes.
３）Decisions of managers are very variable and
adhoc.
４）Therefore, the preïexisting political coalition
structures decisions.
This paper describes the further adaptation to
globalisation in the British LME at the mesoï and
macroï levels. The British cases show that the mar-
ketïled network runs the LME models. The histori-
cal accumulation of conventional behaviours（norms
and practices）directs policy/strategy toward market
circumstances. It intensifies UK bankïmergers toward
a more equityïmarket basis. Priceïsignalling facili-
tated the BoS CEO’s decision to merge with other
British banks on three occasions within ３ years :
NatWest（１９９９－２０００），Abbey National（２０００－
２００１）and Halifax（２００１）．BoS shareholders ordered
Peter Burt to pursue further equity marketïled strate-
gies with higher returns in the shortïterm. Its minor-
ity shareholders and institutional ones forced the
managers to consider wellïbalanced equity marketï
led business performance and customers’ protection
for highest shareïprice. The balance meant that busi-
ness performance would be more important than cus-
tomer service and the other conditions（e.g. working
conditions），should the conditions not affect the
shareïprice. Therefore the former one was more im-
portant for all stakeholders than the latter. The man-
agers were forced toward more equity marketïled
strategies involving customers’ convenience. These
behaviours by market signals led the national author-
ity to adopt defensive merger controls and policies.
Across the period between １９９８ and ２００２，the
banking manager Peter Burt pursued positive M&A
strategies through a variety of TOBs : hostileïtake-
overs with NatWest（which failed）；negotiation with
Abbey National（which was cancelled）；and friendly
consolidation with Halifax（which was successful）．
The methods of these strategies are changeable in
the climate of the UK and EU banking markets,
which have been stimulated by the effects of global-
isation. There is no negotiation process between
managers and regulators in order to decide the na-
tional and corporate strategies of the LME. The
managers do not have subordinate relations with
regulators. However, it is a fact that the BïFSA and
OFT, with advisory intuition, had initiatives to iden-
tify where the best for the longïrun of national in-
terests would come from. The authorities create mar-
ket circumstances for the best performance of British
banking. Thus regulators become coordinators to
guide the unfixed and changeable strategic ap-
proaches of managers according to such circum-
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stances. They control the degree of comprehensive
competitiveness amongst the traditional competitive-
ness based on the British LME, the effects of
globalisation, and profitïmaking in consideration of
customers. Their indirect guidance does not involve
an advisory role from the CC. There is no negotia-
ble or informal roundtable in the openïdoor proc-
esses. At the policy level, regulators simply monitor
to what extent corporate strategies are affected
within a range of regulations. Meanwhile banking
managers also seek marketïled nonïdiscretional
regulation for freedom to choose corporate strategies.
In this context, the takeover policy preferences of
the managers of British banks are based on more
LMEïled characteristics which introduce Japaneseï
style regulatory guidance. In the merger processes,
regulators coordinate the environments for corporate
strategic choice over shareïprice.
Therefore, this paper suggests that the changes
in British merger control have gradually involved the
current alternative effects of globalisation in order to
reinforce the activities of the financial firms of the
most mature capitalist systems in the world, such as
financial firms in the UK. The controls lead firms
to take advantage of free, fair and global competi-
tiveness. Moreover some of the reforms promote mi-
nority and overseas shareholder protections in order
to introduce further capital from other equityïmar-
kets to the British one. Several dimensions of the
changes show the central core of British liberal mar-
ket economy is under transition from LME to an
economic model closed to free market. The M&A
strategies binding the LME institutions have changed
the meaning of benefits, goals of merger and the
sum of financial returns drastically to make shortï
term profits from share prices in merger processes,
whilst, they have a dimension not to consider
merger result. The changes have evolved from na-
tional characteristics and their enhancements as a re-
sult of globalisation and its enhancement of the in-
stitutions for national market economy. Therefore,
merger control also considers the protection from the
adequate resource allowance in the domestic finan-
cial markets via merger activities.
１－３ Causal Schema
To understand this situation, this paper explains
the defined causal schema of British corporate con-
trol（See Table １．１），，through two merger cases
of Bank of Scotland（BoS）（See Table１．２）．
This chapter suggests the developed causal
schema modelling the distribution as an analytical
framework of this paper. The schema is based upon
that of Gourevitch and Shinn（２００５）（Table１．１）．
Their model sketches out the political, policy and
Gourevitch and Shinn ２００５ This research
Political Dimension Preferences and Institutions Power Distribution
Policy Dimension Two policy components of Capitalist Economic Policies Negotiating Merger Policy
Policy Dimension Enforcing Policy
Outcomes Shareholder ownership
Before and after Reform Cases
Before the completion of national M&A promotion BoS's buy-out activity in the case of the NatWest con-flict of １９９８
After the completion of national M&A promotion The failed merger negotiation with Abbey National in２０００；The HBOS case of ２００１
Table １．１Causal Schema
Table １．２：Bank of Scotland's cases of １９９８，２０００，and ２００１
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outcome dimensions of stakeholders’ policy prefer-
ences. The mechanism of policy orientation in this
research is an improvement upon the original model
of Gourevitch and Shinn（２００５）．Their model organ-
ises the political interaction between preferences and
institutions in the policy dimension : a combination
of minority shareholder protections（MSPs）and de-
grees of coordination（DoCs），which together com-
prise what is labelled as capitalist economic politics
（CEPs）（Gourevitch and Shinn，２００５：５８）．However,
this mechanism is not interactive and is only adapt-
able to a static situation. It lacks several elements in
order to understand power distribution models in the
context of three aspects :
１）dynamics and the changes brought about by
globalisation
２）the excluded interests that will react to or op-
pose the system in the two countries.
３）modelling in the distribution of power in the
context of social behaviour and innerïfirm poli-
tics abstracted from a social context and social
values.
Therefore, this paper develops the advantages of
their model and revises its disadvantages.
The first points argues that there are defined
distribution models of power. These distribution
models are defined by the ‘varieties of capitalism’
literature as developed by Gourevitch and Shinn.
This literature focuses on distribution models of
power in takeover activities and their control within
banks : The Japanese CME demonstrates a corpora-
tist political ‘coalition of interests’, while the British
LME suggests an investor model based upon ‘social-
isation of interests’. In Japan, managers and workers
dominate, and operate to the disadvantage of minor-
ity shareholders. Thus the Japanese coalition concen-
trates all stakeholder benefits, except for those of
small shareholders. This power relation is closed and
opaque. On the other hand, in the UK managers
and owners dominate, and operate to the disadvan-
tage of workers. The UK model indicates that a
number of minority shareholders handle the policy
preferences of the stakeholderïregime, although the
model is so far based upon corporatist innerïfirm
relations with workers. In Japan there is a strong
limitation upon merger threats, while in the UK
there is a strong interest in marking mergers.
Second point is negotiation, such as the rela-
tions between regulators and managers, has decided
the degree（balance）of the contradicted components
of comprehensive competitiveness created between a
national capitalist basis and a globalised basis. This
section defines the negotiable regulatory guidance as
an SRR. Regulators handle the degree through SRR
in order to respond to globalisation, which is effec-
tively a policy concerned with mergers, set in a
wider policy about how to respond to financial
globalisation. It focuses on the regulators in the two
countries. Japanese merger policy is essentially ‘de-
fensive’, keeping the globalisation of the financial
market at bay. Regulators have informal relationships
or interaction with the managers of the main banks.
This relationship rests upon a ‘coalition of interests’.
The regulators act as ‘referees’ and construct com-
promises. To the contrary, British merger policy and
defined competitiveness comes from the characteris-
tics of globalisation. The regulators have fewer
shared functions than their Japanese counterparts.
Regulators do not have informal relationships or in-
teraction with the managers of banks. Moreover,
they do not enforce the discretional mergerïcontrols.
Managers handle their banks within financial regula-
tions based upon the liberal market economy. This
can explains two dimensions １）signals of stakehold-
ers signal and types of competitiveness and ２）ex-
cluded interests. These dimensions stress that countri-
下畑浩二
― ４４ ―
／【Ｋ：】Ｓｅｒｖｅｒ／ＯＴＦ四国大学　紀要／Ａ３９号　横／○９　下畑浩二　ｐ３９－６２←ＰＤＦ貼込 2013.04.03 15.42.1
es’ regimes must deal with issues of MSP, EI（Ex-
cluded Interests in innerïfirm actors）and DoC. These
issues become a part of the relationship in both re-
gimes.
Third point is how managers react to the re-
quirements of their banks and of the regulators. The
focus is upon the activities of managers in response
to regulators’ feedback. In Japan, managers distribute
benefits in a highly corporatist fashion, seeking to
maintain the ‘main bank and keiretsu system’. In the
UK, managers protect minority shareholders by seek-
ing profits and protecting liquidity.
In this context, this paper focuses on three
points : Regulatory framework（as Power Distribu-
tion），Policy Dimension and Regulatory compliance
１－４ Structure
The next section discusses the British financial
markets and M&A activities of the UK banks. In
order to support merger processes, the section ex-
plains the mergers with the minimum background
and context of the UK finance/banking industry.
Chapter ３ explores the political dimension of
the Bank of Scotland merger case with NatWest,
and that of the bank’s merger case with Halifax,
based upon the powerïdistribution of the British
market economy５．It focuses on distribution models
of power in takeover activities and their control
within the British LME. The national model shows
that the equity marketïled political coalition in the
ownership structure of BoS is a typical Britishïstyle
coalition, such as a ‘socialisation of interests.’ There-
fore, the BoS CEO, Peter Burt, coordinated its
mergers for the highest common shortïterm benefits
of shareholders. The bank’s M&A activities further
dominated their benefits in the banks and operated
to the advantage of minority shareholders, including
institutional investors as the agencies of minorities.
This power relation is openïaccess and attendant
upon the minimum unit of shareïtrading, such as in
a portfolio investor regime. It does not consider the
innerïpolitical and financial advantages of other
stakeholders, such as workers. Therefore, British
authorities and banking managers preserve nonïnego-
tiable relations in order to guide capital from equity
markets. In the British financial regime, there is less
contradiction about comprehensive competitiveness
between stakeholder policy preferences based on the
equity market and those based on the national capi-
talist model. Stakeholders are investors, and workers
are outside of this political coalition as far as own-
ership structure is concerned. Without negotiating
with banking managers, regulators find the source of
powerïdistribution that acquires the best in industrial
and individual competitiveness in the equity market.
The signals of powerïdistribution in the market are
mediated by the equity marketïled policy preferences
of stakeholders. Regulators（the FSA and OFT）aim
to maintain a global, transparent and freeïmarket en-
vironment. The equity marketïled policy preferences
of stakeholders are required to satisfy both the in-
crease in pressure of globalisation and the further
developments in equity marketïled environments
rooted in the national capitalist system. This nonïne-
gotiable SRR brings freeïhand takeoverïactions and
their methods to banking, except for the dimension
of customer protection. Based on this situation, the
Financial Services Agency and HM Treasury create
banking competitiveness from the characteristics of
the equity markets and from the protection of cus-
tomers. Both authorities reflect the ‘financial group’
regulations on competitiveness. The merger control
regulators，（i.e., the OFT and the Competition Com-
mission）also deal with the definition of competitive-
ness. This shows the British model is far removed
from the corporatist stakeholderïalliance, as seen in
the Japanese and German models. The two merger
Banking M&A Activities and Market Economy in the UK : The Cases of Bank of Scotland
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cases of BoS demonstrate that the alternative effects
of financial globalisation further enhance portfolioï
investing characteristics. Newer regulations consider
accommodating the enhancements of the characteris-
tics within customer convenience. Therefore, the na-
tional model handles the comprehensive policy pref-
erences created between the Britishïstyle investor
model and the effects of globalisation. In this con-
text, there is a strong interest in the UK in encour-
aging mergers.
Chapter ４ explores that negotiation in terms of
relations between regulators and managers（such as
those between the executives of the MoF and its
Old Person, and its successor, the Chief of the
FSA），the BoS CEO Peter Burt had no such infor-
mal relationships. However, it is a fact that the Bï
FSA and OFT, with advisory intuition, had initia-
tives to identify where the best in the longïrun of
national interests would come from. British regula-
tors have fewer functions than those of their Japa-
nese counterparts. Regulators do not have informal
relationships or interaction with the managers of
banks. Moreover, they do not enforce the discre-
tional mergerïcontrols. However they coordinate the
conditions of the playing field for banking business.
Managers manage their banks within financial regu-
lations based on the liberal market economy. In the
merger cases, signals about BoS’s stakeholders’ pol-
icy preferences were generalised and considered the
promotion of LMEïled policies in the FSA and CC.
The FSA and CC monitor obstacles to free corpo-
rate activities. The ‘Excluded Interests’ of innerïfirm
actors, especially those of workers, were partially
considered. This is because business networks and
largeïscale dismissals create internal conflicts within
firms. The possibility of such conflicts may cause a
decline in shareïprice. In actual fact the campaign
of NatWest workers against the BoS takeoverïbid
made itself a factor in the decisionïmaking of the
NatWest CEO, Sir David Rowland. Moreover, the
campaign succeeded in making it so the merger
could not achieve workers’ and customers’ and
shareholders’ benefits. Therefore, the campaign did
not achieve a higher shareïprice in equity markets.
Thus, banking managers are forced to consider MSP
（minority shareholder protection）and customer pro-
tection in this dimension of excluded Interests of in-
terïfirm actors. In the same dimension, Peter Burt
could achieve his successful merger with Halifax,
even though his decision was limited by British
mergerïcontrol regulations such as MSPs, a degree
of excluded Interests of interïfirm actors and regula-
tory degree of coordination about comprehensive
competition for banking business.
Chapter ５ considers how Peter Burt reacted to
internal requirements in the political dimension to
adopt corporate strategies with regulatory supports.
The focus is upon the manager’s activities in re-
sponse to regulators’ feedback. In Britain, banking
managers distribute benefits for high portfolio invest-
ing. This chapter explores how Peter Burt also fol-
lowed these benefits. Then, final section suggests
this paper’s conclusion.
２：British Financial Markets and M&A activi-
ties around ２０００
Financial globalisation has accelerated a series
of British banking M&A activities, while the tradi-
tional distribution pattern of power and finance in
the British LME has been retained with substantial
change. British large bankïmergers provide a good
illustration of the operation and regulation of the
UK mergers market as a prime example of an LME.
Therefore, this section explains the British financial
markets and the M&A activities of UK banks, in
order to support the understanding of merger proc-
esses in the context of Bank of Scotland’s mergers
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with a minimal background and context of the UK
finance/banking industry.
The British banks had lost their leading position
in Europe by the reïstructuring of the international
banking business in Europe after the birth of Euro
market. From １９９３ to ２００５，the world’s top １５０
mega banks for Tier １capital had １７ completed
merger cases in EU market, excluding Great Britain.
The banking M&A movement transformed over ２０
national leading banks in each national market to
several mega financial groups in the European tran-
snational market : Deutsche Bank Group, BNP
Paribas Group, BSCH, UBS, ING, Hypovereinsbank
（South Germany, Czech and Austria），and Nordea
Group（North Europe）．These mega financial groups
now dominate the European market and British
banks have lost their traditional influential position
in the area.
Since the １９９０s, the British financial markets
have been surrounded by big opportunities and
threatening powers from outside rivals. One of the
big opportunities of１９９０s came as the world capital
movement shifted from Japan to other advanced
countries, especially the US and UK markets. The
reason came from １）the recovering competitiveness
of British financial institutions such as HSBC and
Barclays，２）the reïorganisation of British large
banks from the role of high street depository institu-
tions toward national leading positions with inte-
grated financial services，３）the burdening of Japa-
nese banking with numerous bad loans, and ４）the
advantageous changes in capital accord for UK and
US institutions created by world banking governance,
such as the Bank for International Settlements.
These market circumstances offered British large
banks opportunities to return to their status as glob-
ally prestigious banks with integrated financial serv-
ices. In the first half of the １９９０s, the banks pre-
ferred to enforce M&A activities. In１９９２，HSBC re-
covered its financial situation and enhanced its do-
mestic business networks for showing presence in
the depository banking market. In１９９４，Lloyds Bank
consolidated with TSB bank in order that they
would shift from being investment and corporate
banks for large enterprises to become integrated fi-
nancial institutions with stronger corporate banks for
Small and Mediumïsized Enterprises（SMEs）and re-
tail services. Since the late １９９０s, the attractiveness
of the domestic market and banking administration,
supported by the oldïfashioned safetyïnet, made the
market reputable. The British banks followed US
and European Banking M&A activities. In １９９８，
BNP Paribas and Deutsche Bank intended to buy
NatWest when BoS and RBS engaged in their ‘War’
against NatWest. In２０００，Citigroup acquired Schrod-
ers（acquisition method : sale of business）and Chase
Manhattan bought Robert Fleming in the August（buy
ïout : money）．
In order to retrieve their international top bank-
ing position in the postïpax Japana banking busi-
ness, the British banking industry needed to recon-
struct their competitiveness. Therefore, the govern-
ment established a new competition framework from
１９９８ to ２００３．The main functions of the revised
frameworks were（see Whish，２００３）：
１）The new Competition Act１９９８
２）The creation of the Competition Commission
in１９９８
３）The creation of the FSA in２０００
４）Revised merger control law in２００２
Using the effectiveness of the framework, the
５ biggest British banks also had a series of small
and large M&A activities in national and European
markets. Those M&A activities were capital marketï
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based, and the methods were various. First, HSBC
took buyïout methods for absorbing small and large
banking and insurance groups. In order to show the
HSBC’s presence in the eurozone, HSBC had a
TOB（stockïswap）with a large French commercial
bank, Crdit Commercial de France（CCF）in April
２０００，which had ６５０ branches in France. Between
２０００ and ２００５，the bank purchased or took control
of several of the world’s regional financial net-
works : the NRMA Building Society（Australia），
Demirbank（Turkey），China Securities Investment
Trust Corporation（Taiwan’s leading asset manage-
ment company），and the Bank of Shanghai in２００１．
For accelerating to reform their universal bank-
ing business, Barclays purchased three largeïsize re-
gional banking groups in the domestic and world
markets. In２００１，Barclays formed a strategic alliance
with Legal & General to sell life insurance, pensions
and investment products throughout its UK network.
It also sought to reinforce its building society sec-
tion through Woolwich（one of the world top １５０
banks about Tier １ capital in２００２）through acquisi-
tion method（sell of business）in August２００３．Their
universal bank completed the acquisition of Banco
Zaragozano, one of Spain’s largest banking groups,
in the same year.
RBS completed a merger with their counterparts
for quickïachieving top banks in Britain and Europe
in１９９８，and later, it intended to reinforce their busi-
ness in other world markets through middleïsize dif-
ferent business acquisition（Credit section）．After RBS
completed their acquisition of the National Westmin-
ster Bank after a hostile takeover battle with the
BoS, it became the second largest bank in the Great
Britain and Europe, and the fifth largest in the
world by market capitalization. In the British market,
the business network is saturated by the issue of EU
banking competition rules ; therefore, RBS have
now enlarged the business networks in outside mar-
ket : for instance the ２００５ acquisition of Peoples
Credit Card Services in the US market.
BoS intended to be one of top world banks so
quickly through merger methods with counter part-
ners : Halifax and Abbey National. Bank of Scot-
land’s hostile takeover battle with RBS over Nat-
West was stimulated in its M&A activities by the
competitive European and British market environ-
ments and by British policy reform. A proposal to
merge with Abbey National was pursued, but in
September ２００１，BoS had a multiïbillion pound
merger with Halifax（the second largest mortgage
lender in the UK and in ２０００ one of the top １５０
banks of Tier １ capital in the world）．The new
bank, renamed Halifax Bank of Scotland（HBOS），
has since grown to become the fourth largest bank
in the UK by market value, and the UK’s largest
mortgage lender.
The superïregional bank Lloyds TSB, which in-
tended to specialise in the domestic market, rein-
forced its managing strength through purchasing the
weakening business section, and sold the business
overseas in Oceania and Latin America. The largest
British bank, it also intended to merge with Abbey
National in ２００１，but the Competition Commission
rejected the case. The bank was the focus of other
merger opportunities. It had acquisitions of middleï
sized business banking. In ２００３ it bought Scottish
Widows, one of the most recognised brands in the
life insurance, pensions and investments industry in
the UK. In contrast, in ２００３ Lloyds TSB sold its
subsidiary, NBNZ Holdings, comprising the group’s
New Zealand banking and insurance operations, to
the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group ;
and in ２００４ it sold its business in Argentina to
Banco Patagonia Sudameris and its business in Co-
lombia to Primer Banco del Istmo. It then proceeded
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to sell its credit card business, Goldfish, to Morgan
Stanley Bank International in２００５．
In light of all the merger cases in Britain since
１９９８，the FSA’s reïstructuring of the financial indus-
try led domestic banks to adopt a more capital mar-
ket basis, such as temporary shareholders and cus-
tomer base. Therefore, rational choice M&A activi-
ties show that methods are decided case by case,
which maximises the profits and benefits of share-
holder and customers. Large banks drive a hard bar-
gain with small banks through acquisition, and get
dirt cheap deals. The way could be chosen from
several methods : buyïout（stockïswap with existing
stockholders），sale of business（buying only the nec-
essary business section）．On the other hand, a
merger method is employed when both the business
fields and the networks of the merged and merging
banks are complementary. The most famous case is
the ２００１ case of Halifax（a building society whose
business area was in England）with BoS（a universal
bank with a Scottish business area）．The caseïbyï
case M&A method originally comes from the institu-
tional arrangements of the British LME. The case
was partially structured by national M&A policies,
but mainly by market principles.
The financial market system has evolved to
make mergers more flexible. Various scholars have
analysed the overall modes, especially Zysman’s
trailblasing work displays Japanese financial market
as government control based（Zysman １９８３）．The
British system classified equityïmarket system. This
chapter empirically analyses how the fiduciary duty
of British banking boards reflects the institutional ar-
rangements of each market, so that there is an insti-
tutional fit between M&A activities and institutional
arrangements through a national changing strategy
for banking M&A activities, although national mod-
els of capitalism adapt to the increase in financial
globalisation. It also shows an empirical case in the
British LME model in comparison with before and
after the British financial industry competition reform
of１９９８ to２０００．The case study is chosen from the
case of a British mega bank, from whose history is
taken several caseïbyïcase M&A activities.
Through these chronicled comparisons, the cases
can help the analysis of how banks need the charac-
teristics of the national capitalist model in order to
raise their competitiveness with regulatory institu-
tions. Moreover, the comparison of certain banking
M&A cases can identify which part of ‘institutional
fits’ is emphasised between the regulators and banks
in bank mergers. In this context, the analytical sub-
ject can be generalised, as the main advanced capi-
talist system in the world has undergone similar
changes in the same periods. The CEO of BoS is
symbolic of the competition era. He is very sensitive
to requests from the equity market, as he was pro-
moted from the bank’s North Sea Oil analyst to be-
come its CEO. His merger decisions and activities
show how British banks are required to allocate
shareholders’ benefits. Therefore, this chapter consid-
ers the BoS cases.
３：Managers and Regulators in Regulatory
Framework
The LME model which the UK currently adopts
is the best for the national interests of the banking
business. The mechanism aims at achieving the
highest performance of corporate, industrial and na-
tional benefits. In other words, British banks and
regulators establish an institutional ‘national M&A
strategy’, from multilayered stakeholderïincentives
within firms in the British LME. The aim of the
strategy is to achieve the best in the longïrun for
their national interests. In this context, there is a de-
finitive British model of power distribution in firms’
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ownership structure. The model is defined by the‘va-
rieties of capitalism’ literatures such as Hall and
Soskice（２００１），and EstevezïAbe et al（２００１）．This
paper focuses on several dimensions in the structure
in regard to takeover activities and their control
within banks. The British LME suggests an investor
model（Hall and Soskice，２００１），and a ‘socialisation
of interests’.
Many debate about financial systems and corpo-
rate governance in the UK is focused on sharehold-
ers’ rights and influence on corporate activities（Vi-
tols，２００１；Gourevitch and Shinn，２００５；Mallin,
Mullineux and Wihlborg．２００５）．This section focuses
on power distribution under innerïfirm politics.
The British model of the capitalist system has a
different degree of regulatory coordination about
comprehensive competitiveness between stakeholder
policy preferences based on the equity market and
those based on national capitalist model in compari-
son with Japanese model. In Britain, the degrees of
contradiction about comprehensive competitiveness
between characteristics of the national capitalist sys-
tem and the effects of globalisation become smaller.
British regulators have an equity marketïled admin-
istrative approach, while globalisation’s effects force
them to pursue further liberal policies with shorterï
term and higher returns. Contradictions must be mi-
nor. Therefore, regulators have no imperative to ter-
minate the gap between globalisation’s effects and
institutions for national market coordination. There-
fore, this paper establishes that Bank of Scotland did
not have strong direct regulatory guidance against
stockïmarket trends.
British governmentïindustry relations do not
need Japaneseïstyle negotiable regulatory guidance
on takeoverïactions and their methods. As the con-
tradiction becomes smaller, negotiable regulatory
guidance does not need contact with merger control.
This regulatory contact to firms creates a homogene-
ous pattern of power distribution in corporate gov-
ernance and in equity markets. In the BoS cases,
Peter Burt and the regulators followed merger con-
trol on the relative coherent competitiveness between
investorïbased policy preference and the increase in
equity marketïbased market environments. Burt and
the owners dominated the bank and operated to the
disadvantage of workers.
Peter Burt had a significant role as the repre-
sentative of dominant innerïpolitical and financial
figures in the portfolio investor model（Vi-
tols，２００１），the investor model（Gourevitch and Shinn
２００５）or the socialisation of interests. Therefore, gov-
ernment policy processes demanded that his deci-
sions and their results had to satisfy the needs of
minority investors. It should be understood that “cor-
porate governance in the banking and financial sec-
tor differs from that in the nonfinancial sectors be-
cause of the broader risk that banks and financial
firms pose to the economy”（Alexander ２００４）．The
parliamentïdebates on Northern Rock’s insolvency
（The Treasury Committee, House of Commons
UK，２００８a and２００８b）and the procedure of tempo-
rary nationalisation in February ２００８ display the
strong regulatory forces for banking management.
This does not means that the indirect banking ad-
ministration mainly for avoiding financial instability
has no strong control in banking.“The UK govern-
ment is reportedly considering requiring all institu-
tional investors to state their investment policies and
explain their voting behaviour（or lack of it）at corpo-
rate shareholder meetings．（Mallin, Mullineux and
Wihlborg．２００５：５３８）．However, in nonïrisk situ-
ation, Burt is a representative of dominant innerï
firm political and financial figures in BoS. Since
Burt he became the Chief Executive of BoS, he
achieved an increase in the profits of the bank :
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“….profits at the Bank of Scotland increased on
a preïtax basis from １５７．９m in １９８８ to１．０７７
bn in the last financial year（February２００１）be-
fore the merger with the Halifax.”
（HBOS Press release８th２００２，Peter Burt to Retire
from HBOS）
In considering the whole period of his career,
such achievements had indeed satisfied shareholderï
value. On the other hand, his merger activities with
NatWest did not achieve their expected outcome,
though the nonïaccomplished activities raised the
reputation of BoS in the equityïmarket. Regardless
of the result, involvement in the NatWest TOB com-
petition made a reputation for BoS on the global
stage that promoted his shareholders’ requests and
his own reputation in the financial industry.
Moreover, whether the M&A cases became suc-
cessful or not, he could not avoid his decision to
pursue mergers with NatWest and Halifax. This is
because the four aspects of globalisation’s effects
changed the financial markets, forcing BoS managers
into merger activities. These aspects are as follows :
１）More transnational business（e.g. the birth of
the Euro, development and enlargement of the
EU）
２）Business is conducted across financial sectors
（e.g. insurance companies’participation in bank-
ing market）
３）More capital marketïbased M&A activities
（market trends and regulatory framework are
both investorïled and customerïled）
４）Gigantism（from international competitiveness）
Changes in the European banking market affect
the fiduciary responsibility of British banking direc-
tors. The banking M&A movement transformed from
over２０ national leading banks in each country mar-
ket to several mega financial groups in the European
transnational market and across financial sectors. For
example, in Western continental Europe, Deutsche
Bank Group, BNP Paribas Group, Credit Agricole
Group, AXA, and Uni Credit Group have substantial
control of transïfinancial sectors in southern Ger-
many, Austria, northern Italy and Eastern Europe.
Shareholders also obtain major opportunities to gain
profits from stock exchanges. M&A is one of the
most effective managing activities to impact upon
equity markets. Managers also effectively show their
achievements. In the cases of the NatWest competi-
tion and Halifax merger, there was one common
factor in the managers’ decisions. Shareholders dur-
ing that period required him to conduct M&A ac-
tivities in order to seek shorterïterm and higher re-
turns, while managers sought protect their reputation
and position through such activities. In order to pre-
serve their reputation in equity markets and their po-
sition in firms, managers pursued shorterïterm and
higher profits whether the merger case was success-
ful or not. As it happened, the NatWest merger
must be considered a failure. This is because in this
TOB competition, the big name financial groups in
Europe and the US, such as BoS, RBS, BNP, ABN
AMRO Bank, Paribas, Deutsche Bank and Merrill
Lynch, participated or announced their participation
in the merger. This paper takes the position that Pe-
ter Burt made his decision on M&A activities in or-
der to profit both from successful and from unsuc-
cessful mergers. This section suggests two matters :
firstly, how Burt coordinated the shareholders’ re-
quest according to more equity marketïled regulatory
circumstances, and also achieved a gain in shareï
price from the failed case, and secondly how he
dealt with shareholders’ pressure for institutional in-
tegration.
In the NatWest case, the political imperative
upon BoS was to maintain the powerïdistribution in
the British market economy as defined in Chapter
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５． First, the managers of both banks, Peter Burt
（BoS）and Sir David Rowland（NatWest），pursued
different profits for shareholders and different strate-
gies. Burt aimed to decrease the business network of
NatWest in Scotland and England, while Robinson
had the responsibility to take benefits from TOB
competition. At that moment, BoS was the６th larg-
est bank in the UK and categorised as a follower in
the British banking business. The bank was not only
a depository, corporate banking and credit card busi-
ness in Scotland, but also an investing bank in
Europe. The Scottish bank was also known for its
finance activities in the energy sector（energy fi-
nance），which derived from its position as the finan-
cial source of North Sea Oil. The bank had a com-
pact and efficient organisational and business net-
work for earning performance. Burt announced a
sharp costïcutting plan in anticipation of a bid for
NatWest : cutting １５，０００ employees, relocating or
shrinking the retail business network of NatWest up
to ９０ percent of its branches（１７００ branches），and
closing over４０ data processing centres（１１th October
１９９９，Financial Mail）．Thus BoS followed a shorter
profitable M&A strategy. The achievement of this
aim raised BoS’s business performance through cut-
ting a difficult business segment, which did not
make large profits. The bank wanted a more profitï
led business segment, with the assets and brand
name of NatWest. The merger totally followed a
shortïterm profitable stance through M&A activities.
Therefore, on４th October １９９９，BoS pushed forward
with its hostile bid for NatWest. Later, it preceded
the TOB in corporation with Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter & Co.
In contrast, NatWest pursued different strategies
through this merger. Their aim was a diversified fi-
nancialïservices group, keeping the big name, its in-
fluence in various banking businesses, and its broad
network in the UK and overseas. This TOB compe-
tition was also one of their strategies. However, BoS
was an unexpected merger partner. Therefore, Nat
West adopted defensive policies. The NatWest CEO,
Sir David Rowland, said :
“With a strengthened leadership team, NatWest
is now set to accelerate the delivery of share-
holders’value … Bank of Scotland’s offer does
not reflect this potential.”
（２８th October１９９９，International Herald）
The Chief Operating Officer, David Rowland,
also argued that hostile takeovers erode value be-
cause they involve very substantial risks（２８th October
１９９９，International Herald）．The scale of the Scottish
bank was only one third of NatWest. It is difficult
to understand how the smaller bank had sufficient
reputation in equity market to integrate mega bank
effectively. The mergerïtarget may in practice absorb
characteristics of the smaller bank.
The starting point of the BoS M&A activities
was the poor shareïmarket reputation of the ex-
pected NatWest and Legal and General merger in
１９９９． The first expectation of a merger between
banking and insurance companies substantially re-
duced NatWest share price. Peter Burt said, “Nat-
West is a great business which has been underman-
aged for many years. It has been losing market
share and is very inefficient. We intend to turn it
round”（７th January２０００，BBC）．In this context, BoS
found an opportunity to break up the NatWest
Group and dispose of nonïretail assets after with-
drawing its application to start a banking business in
the US with in a joint venture with Pat Robertson.
In the merger case, Burt was required equityï
market led sustainable mergerïcontrol without discre-
tional regulatory guidance. The political coalition
was of portfolioïinvestor models（Vitols，２００１）and
the soïcalled investor（Gourevitch and Shinn，２００５），
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requiring Burt to pursue shorterïtermed gains
through a merger. Shareholders and the financial
market have more considerable power over managing
directors in large UK firms through hostile takeovers
than in Japan（Prowse，１９９４）．Thus in the UK there
is a strong interest in making mergers work prop-
erly. The fiduciaries of managers are more responsi-
ble to portfolioïbased shareholders and their compe-
tence in decisionïmaking is concentrated. They are
called CEOs and their authorities are not equivalent
to those of Japanese firms’ managers. As mentioned
in chapter５，a CEO considers :
“Share price, owned portfolio shareholders in-
terested mainly in share price and willing to
support riskier strategies, and faced with a la-
bour force responding positively to performance
incentives and only weakly able to oppose re-
structuring plans.”
（Vitols，２００１：３５９）
The domination of CEOs and incentives at Brit-
ish companies has strong links with the shortïterm
achievements of share price. Therefore, Burt was re-
quired to suggest the expected amount of financial
gains at the corporate level so as to coordinate
shareholders’ benefits and their mergerïcontrol pref-
erences for further profits in equity markets. BoS
announced the TOB method it had also promised to
implement as part of its £２２ billion（＄３６．３５ bil-
lion）bid（２８th October１９９９，International Herald）．
Stockholders in British banks seek financial
profits through managing banking corporate assets.
Drastic changes in the domestic banking market
stimulated by globalisation pose institutional obsta-
cles for capital liquidity. They support highïprofit-
ability strategies of firms through buying shares, and
freely withdraw their support through the sale of
shares. Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter ４， the
Market for Corporate Control in an LME drives
broad ranges of their support on market principle.
Their mergerïpolicy preferences toward policyïmak-
ers are that the market authorities guarantee and fur-
ther promote the fair, transparent, and free financial
market in order to take advantage of the globalisa-
tion of finance. Therefore, there was a convergence
of policy preferences between Burt and the share-
holders.
In the Halifax case, Burt was required to adopt
a consolidation method. British firms’ dominant
owners are portfolio investors who are primarily in-
terested in share price and diversified shareholding
across many companies（Vitols ２００１：３５１；Goure-
vitch and Shinn２００５）．Therefore, they are sensitive
to financial market trends and mergerïwaves in the
industry. Since ２０００，globalisation’s effects upon the
banking industry create the following dimensions in
the financial markets. First, in the UK universal
banking often adopts acquisition（buyïout）with do-
mestic and international rivalries for competitiveness
in financial market, focusing both on the creditïcard
and mortgage markets.
Second, since the reïstructuring of the national
regulatory framework for financial system competi-
tiveness from１９９７ to２０００，British mega banks have
become more strongly engaged in ‘defensive M&A
strategies’ for their Liberal Market Economy frame-
work. Thus the banks take a more capital marketï
led M&A method（buyïout : stockïswap）for interna-
tional competitiveness from the view of shareholders
and customers. Basically, in LMEs boards of corpo-
rate management have managed their corporate
strategies freely. However, at the macro level, the
strategies of individual firms in LMEs have certain
integrated characteristics and goals on market princi-
ples.
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In this context, the merger of BoS and Halifax
to form HBOS created a major and distinctive com-
petitor in the UK financial services market, having
the scale and expertise to move from the ‘Big４’era
to a Big５one. BoS aimed at becoming a further di-
versified and international financial group. On the
other hand, Halifax expected to enhance their mort-
gage business on the mergerïwave.
This combination fulfilled the short and middleï
term profitable perspective of BoS’s and Halifax’s
shareholders and directors. BoS and Halifax were
both major UK financial services groups which had
successfully pursued their stated strategies and cre-
ated strong platforms for further growth. Actually,
the Boards of BoS and Halifax believed the merger
to be a compelling business combination which of-
fered substantial benefits for shareholders, customers
and employees（HBOS Press Release，８th November
２００２）．It meant that Burt’s fiduciary responsibility
lay in the profits and benefits of shareholders, cus-
tomers and employees. Halifax and the Bank of
Scotland had complementary businesses, brands,
product strengths and distribution capabilities. BoS
and Halifax overlapped neither in business categories
nor in geographical spheres. BoS, the Scotlandïbased
bank, had very strong activities in the corporate
market and was a leading provider of credit cards
for organisations, like universities, and social clubs.
However the bank did not have enough branches in
England. Halifax in England specialized in the mort-
gage market and had a strong customer base. Many
Halifax customers were stockholders, since it trans-
formed itself from a building society into a bank.
Thus the M&A activity was good investment for
these ‘shareholders’. Moreover, directors should be
also listed in this beneficial relation. The Board of
Directors of HBOS was drawn equally from the
Boards of BoS and Halifax. Dennis Stevenson be-
came the Chairman of HBOS, Peter Burt became
fullïtime Executive Deputy Chairman and James
Crosby became CEO. In order to achieve this, the
shareholders of BoS and Halifax received one share
in HBOS for each Halifax Share or BoS Stock Unit
they currently held. Following the transaction, BoS’s
proprietors held a balance of approximately ３７ per
cent, while Halifax’s shareholders held approximately
６３ percent of the issued ordinary share capital of
HBOS. The proprietors of BoS were also entitled to
the recommended final dividend of１０p for the year
ending ２８th February ２００１．For these reasons, both
banks announced a ‘merger’ which their shareholders
and customers could find acceptable. Therefore, the
merger had a substantial direct personal customer
base and the means to unlock the significant com-
mercial opportunities offered by BoS’s and Halifax’s
partnerships and alliances. This merger maintained a
real profitable stance based on the equity market.
Regarding this merger, Peter Burt, the Group CEO
at BoS said :
“There is an exceptional fit between our two
groups ï we have complementary businesses
and shared strategies and cultures. Not only
will this merger accelerate the existing pros-
pects of both groups, it will also deliver signifi-
cant additional opportunities for growth.”
（HBOS，２００１）
James Crosby, CEO of Halifax also announced
“HBOS will be the proïcompetition champion deliv-
ering value and transparency to customers and sus-
tained growth for shareholders”（HBOS，２００１）．The
profitable stance of BoS in this case is a shortïterm
profitable stance with middleïterm managing stabil-
ity, with BoS expanding into the other financial sec-
tors and business network in a different region. Pe-
ter Burt reached an equity marketïled policy prefer-
ence in order to consolidate his reputation on the
stock exchange
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４：Managers and Regulators on Policy Di-
mension
Banking managers and regulators make efforts
to coordinate globalisation’s effects for them to be
the best in the long run for their national interests.
The LME model which the UK currently adopts
achieves the best for this purpose. The portfolioï
based shareholders exercise little influence（Vi-
tols，２００１：３５１）through the stock exchange in firms’
decision making. The pressure of financial globalisa-
tion has changed administrative merger control to-
ward further competitionïpromotion and capital mar-
ketïoriented methods. The BoS merger case of１９９９
was conducted under older M&A control with an
older competition framework than the Tories’ na-
tional competition campaign in the financial industry.
In this context, the British regulator, the Bï
FSA, was forced to confront the inefficiency under
globalisation of the British finance, profit and power
distribution mechanism. The authorities had to create
a form of confronting the effects of globalisation in
order to take advantage of international market envi-
ronments. They had reformed its regulations and fi-
nancial market environments to attract further capital
for several years before and after ２０００． Banking
monitoring was reinforced by an independent organi-
sation, the FSA, and a governmental mergerïadvi-
sory board was reinforced, being wellïorganised and
independent of the OFT, the FSA and the Competi-
tion Commission. Its successor, the BïFSA, has pro-
moted a series of financial reforms. They offer
banks a legal framework for preserving the effective-
ness and efficiency of international banking competi-
tiveness, in order to gradually and continuously re-
spond to the changes in free capital markets. As
part of these reforms, merger controls are considered
to confront the globalisation. The regulatory guid-
ance of the British FSA handled BoS mergerïstrate-
gies for regulating market environments and mini-
mum regulatory mergerïcontrol along marketïprinci-
ples for a transparent merger process. BoS had no
formal or informal negotiation processes with the
relevant market and political authorities, although
British governmentïindustrial relations also have a
revolving door system like amakudari in the rela-
tions of their Japanese counterparts. At least, BoS
merger strategies show no evidence of the influence
of the informal relations to banking mergers in the
shortïterm. The FSA and CC only offered indirect
protection for domestic banks through defensive
merger procedures for customers’ benefits. The man-
agers of banks’ frameworks aimed at confronting
forthcoming banking megaïcompetition against the
pressures of overseas megaïbanks expected from
overseas bankingïwaves. The legal mergerïcontrol
aimed to allocate the best in the long run for fi-
nance, profit and power distribution in the liberal
market economy ï the allocation of domestic bank-
ing business. This does not mean that regulations
are against the participation of overseas capital in
the British banking business. If the capital brings
broad economic benefits to the British economy, the
regulations do not disturb this participation. The
regulations’ measures, processes, and goals were de-
signed to reinforce the characteristics in the owner-
ship structure that standardised shortïterm free capi-
tal movements. From the NatWest battle to the Hali-
fax agreement, its measures and its processes were
in response to the restructuring of banking business
in the European markets. At the organisational and
regulatory level, shortïterm shareholders raised their
position in the policy and banking ownership struc-
ture. Burt and shortïterm shareholders intended to
merge their other banking in the UK and Europe
when they had the opportunity. This is because the
policies and firms intended to conduct an open mar-
ket in bank shares. Moreover, reformed regulations
have been accelerated to classify ‘survivors’ or ‘los-
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ers’ as leading banks in Europe or in the world in
financial business with international regulatory re-
gimes. As a result, in BoS merger strategies, regula-
tory guidance and banking management were ex-
pected to involve more profitability and shareholder
value.
First, the transition of banking supervision in
the period of ‘Battle of NatWest’ must be under-
stood. In June １９９８，before the start of the ‘battle’,
banking supervision was transferred to the BïFSA
from the Bank of England. On the other hand, until
May２０００，the BïFSA waited to handle practical
stock market monitoring, when it took over the role
of UK Listing Authority from the LSE. Banking
managing activities were not completed in considera-
tion of stock market structure. However, the Office
of Fair Trading’s Enterprise Merger control of １９７４
ensures that M&A activities need shareholders.
Second, the old principles could not prevent
NatWest from exposing excessive domestic and in-
ternational rivalries. The participants and domestic
and international candidates of this TOB case were
BoS, RBS, NatWest, Abbey National, Deutsche
Bank, ING Barings, Merrill Lynch, and Goldman
Sachs. The Fair Trade Act １９７３，s８４，requires that
the OFT refers cases to the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission to judge whether a merger is in the
public interest of British citizens. The excessive
TOB candidates from overseas in this case suggest
that domestic banks nearly failed to achieve ‘public
interest’ in the competition policy framework.
In this context, Burt and the British regulators
coordinated merger control for the regulatory coordi-
nation of competitiveness between stakeholder policy
preferences based on the equity market and those
based on the national capitalist model in order to
preserve the power distribution under merger proc-
esses. Protecting the distribution conducts the best in
the long run for their national interests. This is be-
cause the institutional structure of the existing na-
tional capitalist system creates business opportunities
and activities（Hall and Soskice２００１；２４）．Industrial
and individual competitiveness was caused between
stakeholder policy preference based on the effects of
globalisation on equity markets, and on the national
capitalist model. This paper believes that regulatory
coordination will be promoted by negotiation. Nego-
tiation, such as relations between regulators and
managers, has decided the degree（balance）of contra-
dicted components of comprehensive competitiveness
created between the national capitalist basis and the
globalised basis. The British FSA has the responsi-
bility of increasing the global competitiveness of do-
mestic banks, while emphasising the national differ-
ences in the field of M&A strategy against the
global standardisation of banking regulations. On the
other hand, banks reinforce the national capitalist
system through their competitiveness with regard to
capital accumulation from outer markets, and they
synchronise their M&A tactics. However, in Britain
the contradiction between globalisation’s effects and
the characteristics of its national capitalist system is
smaller, and so negotiable regulatory guidance does
not need contact with merger control. This regula-
tory contact with firms creates a different power dis-
tribution in corporate governance in comparison with
Japanese regulation.
In the first merger case, Burt and regulators
had no investigation of his drastic NatWest shrinking
plan to increase the efficiency of firms and gains on
stock exchanges. Since ２７th September １９９９，regula-
tory institutions had had no contact with BoS activi-
ties. However, it could be confirmed that regulators
offered them freeïhandled liberal market circum-
stances.
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In the Halifax case, regulators and BoS with
Halifax did not direct coordination for the HBOS
merger. The BïFSA coordinated the market circum-
stances through competition guidance. There were
two British administrative M&A controls in ２００１．
One was that of the Competition Commission and
OFT with the １９９８ competition policy. The other
was the BïFSA’s indirect administration with the Fi-
nancial Services and Markets Act ２０００． First, the
Competition Commission conducted inïdepth inquir-
ies into M&A, market conduct and the regulation of
the banking and other industries which need compe-
tition regulation. The inquiries’ object had a largeï
scale monopoly situation in that it supplied over ２５
per cent of the reference services. However, the case
of Halifax and BoS was outside of this regulatory
process. Therefore, the Commission did not conduct
more administrative M&A control than its frame-
work, which restricted less than ２５ percent of mar-
ket share in any business. However, banking activi-
ties are regulated by the １９９８ competition policy
and the Fair Trade Act１９７３．The challenge to com-
petition policy is to enhance competition advocacy
and to enforce the policy.
Second, in order to administrate the banking ac-
tivities, BïFSA took indirect supervision over bank-
ing M&A strategies. The Financial Services and
Markets Act２０００ ordered that firms’ activities must
rely on customers’ benefits and investors’ profits. It
had a legal framework to secure the appropriate de-
gree of protection for consumers, while having re-
gard to the degree of risk involved in different
kinds of investment or transaction, the expertise and
experience of consumers, the needs of consumers for
advice and accurate information and the general
principle that consumers should take responsibility
for their decisions ; The BïFSA guided the effective
competition of financial firms to lead to the best
possible level of social welfare, which is the sum of
customers’ utility and firms’ profit（Financial Services
Authority Central Financial Division，２０００）．There-
fore, banking M&A has to achieve profits and bene-
fits to customers and investors. In this case, BoS
chose ‘merger of absorption’, and achieved profits
and benefits for most stakeholders : shareholders,
customers, employees and directors. This shows Brit-
ish M&A cases also accept the ‘merger of absorp-
tion’choice for coordinating stakeholders’ profit and
benefits, as with Japanese banks. Moreover, British
mergerïstyle is caseïby case based on the main fi-
nancial business segments of banks. This suggests
that they support the highïprofitability strategies of
firms through buying shares, and freely withdraw
their support through the sale of shares. Therefore,
regulatory guidance regarding British merger policies
and relevant financial policies respects the equity
marketïled decisions of managers. In this dimension
the policy preferences amongst the shareholders and
managers are portfolioïbased and are wellïaccepted
in the regulatory framework.
In this context, Britain had no contradiction be-
tween the effects of globalisation and the character-
istics of its national capitalist system. Therefore,
regulators do not need direct coordination to make
the best in the longïrun for national interests via
contact to merger control. BoS had discretional man-
agements under British market economy, while Japa-
nese banks had limited mergerïactions under discre-
tional regulatory guidance.
Moreover, British firms’ dominant owners are
portfolio investors who are primarily interested in
share price and diversifying shareholding across
many companies（Vitols，２００１：３５１）．Vitols also ad-
dresses the portfolioïbased shareholders exercise lit-
tle influence through the stock exchange in firms’
decisionïmaking. This suggests that they support the
highïprofitability strategies of firms through buying
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shares, and freely withdraw their support through the
sale of shares. Therefore, regulatory guidance after
the British financial reform of ２０００ respected the
equityïmarketïled managers’ decision. In this dimen-
sion the policy preferences amongst the shareholders
and managers are portfolioïbase. In this context, the
aggregation of policy preferences in British banking
stakeholders is reflected under liberal market circum-
stances.
５：Managers and Regulators with Regulatory
Compliance
This chapter considers how managers react to
the requirements of their banks and of the regula-
tors. The focus is upon managers’ activities in re-
sponse to ‘regulators’ feedback.’ In the UK manag-
ers protect minority shareholders by seeking profits
and protecting liquidity.
Economic global governance has reinforced the
relevant regulations about banking M&A activities
for promoting the LMEïled alliance of political and
economic interests. The US and UK formulated the
regulations governance regime，（e.g. the Basle Capi-
tal Accord）in order to perform market based finance
appropriately within their national market systems.
Capital liquidity under the globalisation of financial
markets becomes higher than in unreformed UK
markets.
The national regulations offer banks and inves-
tors globalising market environments for fair, trans-
parent, global competitiveness with customer protec-
tion. It is argued by many academics and by the
government that the British market economic system
had further reinforced its strength through using
globalisation’s effects on equity markets and external
political pressure for promoting a liberal market
economy. During the period of Japanese bank domi-
nance in the world economy, UK financial institu-
tions and the other industries reïstructure their or-
ganisational strength. After the Japanese era, UK and
US financial institutions returned and share their
worldïleading position.
However, globalisation only helps the increase
in financial and realïestate sectors as investing ac-
tivities in the economy. The national market has
been structured toward advantageous institutions for
globalisation’s effect on capital liquidity. Reformed
institutions collect and strengthen the relationship be-
tween free capital liquidity and Britishïstyle finan-
cial distribution. The London Stock Exchange has
increased its attractiveness to introduce further over-
seas capital, and its success and threatening potential
to the Japanese market has encouraged Japanese fi-
nancial reforms. In the first half of the １９９０s, the
banking wave restructured national banking markets
and the individual strength of large banks. Since the
second half of the １９９０s, the UK financial industry
has been threatened in its domestic markets by its
US and western European rivalries, as seen in the
NatWest and Abbey National cases. However, the
top financial groups（HSBC and Barclays）and their
followers（RBS and BoS）established their global
presence in the international financial business in
this period. In particular, the Scottish banks stepped
up to leading positions in the UK and European
markets in the corporate banking, mortgage and
credit card sectors. HSBC has enhanced its presence
and scale in the world financial business form. It
was a large bank in the UK and a world top bank
in the first half of the １９８０s, but had undeveloped
domestic networks in mainland Great Britain until
the beginning of the １９９０s. Midland, Barclays, Nat-
West and Lloyds had influential powers in Europe.
However their presence was confined to Europe dur-
ing the US’s leading position in the capitalist re-
gimes during the cold war and the Japanese eco-
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nomic boom. RBS and BoS engaged in depository,
corporate, investing, and credit business in Scotland.
Their presence was known in specific financial sec-
tions（e.g BoS, investing North Sea Oil ; RBS, with
a nonïdense but wide Scottish business network）．
Globalisation and regulations of economic global
governance（e.g. the Basle Accord of BIS and bank-
ing orders in the EU）reveal the substantial bargain-
ing power of British banks and their indirect regula-
toryïprotection. After the NatWest battle, RBS and
BoS showed their potential power, and they were
thrown into mega competition.
In this context, the BoS CEO, Peter Burt, en-
forced higher protection of minority shareholders. He
had highïreturn management on their shareïprices to
create shareholders’interests. Burt also sought per-
sonal honour. It is a fact that his personal promo-
tion was an easy way to achieve his ambition of
advancing from investing in the oil industry section
to the director’s position. His achievements were
shown by shareïprices in the equity market. In his
CEO periods, BoS three times experienced big
merger plans : with NatWest, Abbey National, and
Halifax.
These events could reflect the drastic increase
in share price. Therefore, he paid attention to the
market financeïbased finance, profit and power dis-
tribution. The banks sought indirect governmentï
merger control to further adapt globalisation through
mergers. A series of financial reforms promoted
LMEïled institutions in the capitalist system. Indeed,
a series of financial reforms made easier accessibility
to free capital markets in order to attract capital and
investors interests to British financial markets.
The Bank of Scotland and NatWest mergers
disturbed the efficient distribution on the part of the
NatWest customers, investors, and even NatWest
workers’ conditions although BoS only obtained the
efficient distribution on larger scale. Moreover, the
RBS offer was more attractive than the BoS one. In
this context, at the policy level, adaptation to finan-
cial globalisation accepts BoS’s failure in the free
capital markets. NatWest adopted defensive strategies
for avoiding the Scottish Bank’s hostile TOB. Burt
welcomed the NatWest activities : “...the defence
strategy had acknowledged the merits of the take-
over offer from his bank while demonstrating the
‘inadequate’ National Westminster Bank PLC”（Inten-
rational Herald，２８ th, October，１９９９，）．NatWest’s
strategies and this response from Burt led to the de-
cline of NatWest Share on LSE : the average of the
stockïfalls was ２％ to １３．７５％（International Her-
ald，２８ th October１９９９）．In this context, the policy
feedback to corporate strategies is mainly for coordi-
nating further free, transparent, and developed equity
ïmarket environments, while encouraging managers
to protect customers’ financial profits in the arena of
M&A strategies. The regulators promoted the best M
&A patterns with banking M&A strategies on the
basis of the national capitalist model through indirect
mergerïcontrol. The national changing strategies for
banking M&A activities comprised capital marketï
based competitive components and the coïoperative
components with banking M&A activities. In the
NatWest case, the LME model shows that the ten-
dency becomes stronger than before regulatory re-
form for financial market competitiveness.
The HBOS merger case was for a merger part-
ner to crossïsell products to each customer. The
HBOS merger announcement was expected :
“The merger will allow the banks to challenge
the ‘big four’ UK High Street banks, and mus-
cle in on the “profitable” market of offering
banking services to small businesses.”
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（BBC News，４May２００１）
Burt said in the first merger announcement :
“We have complementary businesses and shared
strategies and cultures. …Not only will this
merger accelerate the existing prospects of both
groups, it will also deliver significant additional
opportunities for growth.”
（BBC News，４ May２００１）
The national changing strategies for banking M
&A activities comprised the capital marketïbased
competitive components and the coïoperative compo-
nents with banking M&A activities via market envi-
ronments. Burt and Halifax CEO James Crosby iden-
tified benefits for shareholders, customers, workers,
and themselves in the crossïsectional consolidation
of the financial industry. The business logic to cre-
ate benefits via the merger was accepted in the eq-
uity market, and by the other stakeholders. The
merger decision involved new factors in new regula-
tory regimes, such as profit of customers, which the
former regulatory framework did not protect. Actu-
ally, the HBOS merger achieved the crossïsale of
products to each banks.
These situations show that British banks adopted
an Intensive（LMEïintensive）Inside Mechanism :
１）Corporate strategy preserves and enhances the
preïexisting equity marketïled finance and
power distribution mechanism.
２）The CEOïdominated system becomes subordi-
nates to minority shareholders and institutional
‘agent’ investors（i.e., agents of minority inves-
tors）．Managers become fiduciaries of the corpo-
ration. Therefore,
３）The bank merger administration and its policy
further modify equityïled market environments
for corporate activities. Regulations remove ob-
stacles for the LME, and promote M&A activi-
ties
４）FSA authorities contain more LMEïled ele-
ments in mergerïcontrol and its relevant poli-
cies. They intensify the preïexisting British
characteristics of market economy.
The mechanism in Britain and Japan guides de-
fensive ways for megaïbank merger through adapta-
tion to globalisation.
As a result, British national M&A strategy and
its policy feed back modify the free decisionïmak-
ing of managers in their choice of corporate strate-
gies. The diversified choice of M&A strategies is
derived from shortïterm benefits for ‘payïas you
go’ïbased smallïshareholders. Large banks drive a
hard bargain with small banks through acquisition,
and get dirt cheap deals. The way could be chosen
from several methods : buyïout（stockïswap with ex-
isting stockholders），sale of business（buying only the
necessary business section）．
６：Conclusion
This paper examined how a prototype LME has
responded in the context of globalisation and com-
petitive challenges. It stresses that the regulatory sys-
tem of competition policy had a profound influence
over strategies of domestic consolidation. It worked
through shareholder influence to increase the LME
characteristics of the financial system and encour-
aged British banks to rebuild a strong competitive
position within global markets. In this context, Brit-
ish corporate governance toward globalisation under-
pins traditional institutional settings underpin DoC,
MSPs, and EI.
Therefore, this paper concludes that the changes
下畑浩二
― ６０ ―
／【Ｋ：】Ｓｅｒｖｅｒ／ＯＴＦ四国大学　紀要／Ａ３９号　横／○９　下畑浩二　ｐ３９－６２←ＰＤＦ貼込 2013.04.03 15.42.1
in British merger control have gradually involved the
current alternative effects of globalisation in order to
reinforce the activities of the financial firms of the
most mature capitalist systems in the world, such as
financial firms in the UK. The controls lead firms
to take advantage of free, fair and global competi-
tiveness. Moreover some of the reforms promote mi-
nority and overseas shareholder protections in order
to introduce further capital from other equityïmar-
kets to the British one. Several dimensions of the
changes show the central core of British liberal mar-
ket economy is under transition from LME to an
economic model closed to free market. The M&A
strategies binding the LME institutions have changed
the meaning of benefits, goals of merger and the
sum of financial returns drastically to make shortï
term profits from share prices in merger processes,
whilst, they have a dimension not to consider
merger result. The changes have evolved from na-
tional characteristics and their enhancements as a re-
sult of globalisation and its enhancement of the in-
stitutions for national market economy. Therefore,
merger control also considers the protection from the
adequate resource allowance in the domestic finan-
cial markets via merger activities.
Footnotes
１．Globalization defines these meanings in the same
way as transitionalists, categorized by Held（１９９９）．
For example, the representative research is based on
Giddens（１９９０，２００１），Hutton and Giddens（２０００），
Sassen（１９９６），and Scholte（１９９３）．They theorized
that globalisation “is a central driving force behind
the rapid social, political, and economic changes that
are reshaping modern societies and world order”
（Held, David Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt,
and Jonathan Perraton．，１９９９：７），and “the proc-
ess by which interaction between humans, and the
effects of that interaction, occur across global dis-
tances with increasing regularity, intensity and
speed”（Lent，２００２）．See the reference, Held, David
Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan
Perraton（１９９９），Global Transformations, Politics,
Economics and Culture, Stanford : Stanford Univer-
sity Press. Giddens, Anthony（１９９０）The Conse-
quences of Modernity, Stanford : Stanford University
Press. Giddens, Anthony（２００１）Sociology（forth edi-
tion），Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Sas-
sen, Saskia（１９９６）Losing control? : sovereignty in
an age of globalization, New York : Columbia
University Press. Scholte, Jan Aart（１９９３）Interna-
tional relations of social change, Buckingham :
Open University Press. Lent, Adam（２００２）“Globalisa-
tion”, Global Knowledge, Fabian Global Forum
２．The aggregate value of a firm’s outstanding common
shares.
References
（Publication in English）
Alexander, Kern（２００４）Corporate Governance and Banking
Regulation, CFAP Working Paper No．１７，CFAP, Cam-
bridge Judge Business School, University of Cam-
bridge.
EstevezïAbe, Margarita, Torben Iversen, and David
Soskice．２００１．Social Protection and the Formation of
Skills : A Reinterpretatiion of the Welfare State in Pe-
ter Hall and David Soskice. Varieties of Capitalism.
Oxford University Press.
Financial Services Authority, UK．１９９８．Financial Services
Regulations : Enforcing the New Regime, consultation
paper. http : //www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp１７．pdf
Financial Services Authority, UK Central Financial Divi-
sion．（２０００）．Making Policy in the FSA : How to take
account of competition policy, July.
http : //www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/policy_making.pdf
Giddens, Anthony（１９９０）The Consequences of Modernity,
Stanford : Stanford University Press.
Giddens, Anthony（２００１）Sociology（forth edition），Cam-
bridge : Cambridge University Press.
Gourevitch, Peter Alexis. and James J. Shinn．（２００５）．Po-
litical Power and Corporate Control. Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Hall, Peter and David Soskice．（２００１）．Varieties of capi-
talism : The institutional Foundations of Comparative
Advantage, Oxford University Press.
HBOS．２００１．Merger of Bank of Scotland and Halifax to
Create. HBOSplc.
Held, David Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and
Jonathan Perraton（１９９９），Global Transformations, Poli-
tics, Economics and Culture, Stanford : Stanford Uni-
versity Press.
Banking M&A Activities and Market Economy in the UK : The Cases of Bank of Scotland
― ６１ ―
／【Ｋ：】Ｓｅｒｖｅｒ／ＯＴＦ四国大学　紀要／Ａ３９号　横／○９　下畑浩二　ｐ３９－６２←ＰＤＦ貼込 2013.04.03 15.42.1
Hutton, Will, and Anthony Giddens．（２０００）Global Capi-
talism, W W Norton & Co Inc.
Lent, Adam（２００２）“Globalisation”, Global Knowledge, Fa-
bian Global Forum
Mallin, Chris, Andy Mullineux and Clas Wihlborg．２００５．
The Financial Sector and Corporate Governance : the
UK case, Corporate Governance，１３（４），July.
Prowse, Stephen D．１９９４．‘Corporate Governance in an
International Perspective : a Survey of Corporate Con-
trol Mechanisms among Large Firms in the United
States, the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany’. BIS
Economic Papers，４１，July. Basle : Bank for Interna-
tional Settlement.
Sassen, Saskia（１９９６）Losing control? : sovereignty in
an age of globalization, New York : Columbia Uni-
versity Press.
Scholte, Jan Aart（１９９３）International relations of social
change, Buckingham : Open University Press.
Treasury Committee, House of Commons UK．２００８a. The
run on the Rock, Fifth Report of Session ２００７－０８
Volume １：Report, Together with formal minutes.
http : / /www.publications. parliament. uk / pa / cm２００７０８／
cmselect/cmtreasy／５６／５６ i.pdf
Treasury Committee, House of Commons UK．２００８b. The
run on the Rock, Fifth Report of Session ２００７‐０８
Volume ２：Oral and written evidence.
http : //www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm２００７０８／cmse-
lect/cmtreasy／５６／５６ ii.pdf
Vitols, Sigurt．（２００１）．‘Varieties of corporate governance :
Comparing Germany and UK’, in Hall and Soskice,
Varieties of Capitalism, Oxford University Press：３３７
－３６０．
Vogel, Steven K．２００６．Japan Remodeled : How Govern-
ment and Industry Are Reforming Japanese Capitalism.
Ithaca : Cornell University Press.
Vogel, Steven K. and Naazneen H. Barma. eds．２００７．The
Political Economy Reader : Markets as Institutions.
Routledge.Whish, Richard．２００３．Competition Law. Lon-
don : Butterworths.
YokoiïArai, Mamiko and Takeshi Kawana．（２００７）．Com-
petition Policy in the Banking Sector of Asia. Discus-
sion Paper Series, November ２００７．Financial Research
and Training Center, Financial Services Agency.
Zysman, John．１９８３．Governments, Markets, and Growth :
Fiancial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change,
Ithaca : Cornell University Press.
（Publication in German）
Zugehör, Rainer．（２００３）．Die Zukunft des rheinischen
Kapitalismus : Unternehmen zwischen Kapitalmarkt und
Mitbestimmung Opladen : Leske + Budrich.
（News Papers and Magazines）
Economist, The（March１２２０００）
Financial Mail
International Herald
（Web, News Release and Investor Relations of
Firms）
BBC News web
HBOS Press Release，８th November２００２ Peter Burt to
Retire from HBOS
http : //www.hbosplc.com/media/pressreleases/articles/hbos／
２００２‐１１‐０８‐００．asp
下畑浩二
― ６２ ―
／【Ｋ：】Ｓｅｒｖｅｒ／ＯＴＦ四国大学　紀要／Ａ３９号　横／○９　下畑浩二　ｐ３９－６２←ＰＤＦ貼込 2013.04.03 15.42.1
